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This paper shows that wage inequality in West Germany has increased over
the past three decades, contrary to common perceptions. During the 1980s, the
increase was concentrated at the top of the distribution; in the 1990s, it occurred
at the bottom end as well. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the view that both
in Germany and in the United States, technological change is responsible for the
wideningofthewagedistributionatthetop.Atthebottomofthewagedistribution,
the increase in inequality is better explained by episodic events, such as supply
shocks and changes in labor market institutions. These events happened a decade
later in Germany than in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States witnessed a sharp increase in wage and
earnings inequality during the 1980s (e.g., Bound and Johnson
[1992]; Levy and Murnane [1992]; Murphy and Welch [1992];
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce [1993]; Katz and Murphy [1992];
Acemoglu [2002]). Upper-tail inequality, measured as the 90–50
wage gap, continued to rise at a similar pace during the 1990s,
whereas lower-tail inequality, measured as the 50–10 wage gap,
has been falling or ﬂat since the late 1980s (e.g., Autor, Katz, and
Kearney [2008]).1 A similar increase in inequality in the 1980s
has also been observed in other Anglo-Saxon countries, such as
the United Kingdom (e.g., Gosling, Machin, and Meghir [2000])
and Canada (e.g., Boudarbat, Lemieux, and Riddel [2006]).
In contrast, most countries in continental Europe seem to
have witnessed much smaller increases in inequality in the 1980s,
or no increases at all (see, for example, Freeman and Katz [1995]
and OECD [1996] for a summary of trends in inequality in Eu-
ropean countries). In particular, West Germany, the third largest
economy and the largest exporter in the world, has been singled
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outasacountrycharacterizedbyastablewagedistributionduring
the 1980s (see, for example, Steiner and Wagner [1998]; Prasad
[2004]).2 Numerous scholars cite this stability as evidence against
the hypothesis that the growth of inequality observed in the
United States and United Kingdom is primarily due to skill-based
technological change, as ﬁrms in continental Europe had access
to the same technologies as ﬁrms in the United States or United
Kingdom (e.g., Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux [1999]; Piketty and
Saez [2003]; Saez and Veall [2005]). Possible explanations for this
puzzle include a larger expansion in the relative supply of the
high-skilled in Germany (e.g., Abraham and Houseman [1995];
Acemoglu [2003]), unions and other labor market institutions
(e.g., Krugman [1994]; Abraham and Houseman [1995]),3 and
more recently social norms (e.g., Piketty and Saez [2003]).
This paper revisits the changes in the wage structure in
(West) Germany over the past three decades, between 1975 and
2004. Most existing studies on the German wage structure, such
as OECD (1996) and Steiner and Wagner (1998), are based on the
GermanSocio-EconomicPanel(GSOEP).Weinsteadusea2%ran-
dom sample of social security records, the IABS. We show that the
common perception that Germany’s wage structure has remained
largely stable during the 1980s is inaccurate. We ﬁnd that wage
inequality has increased in the 1980s, but mostly at the top half
of the distribution. In the early 1990s, wage inequality started to
rise also at the bottom half of the distribution. This pattern holds
for both men and women.4 Our analysis highlights that, while
the United States and Germany experienced similar changes at
the top of the distribution during the 1980s and 1990s, the two
countries markedly differed with respect to the lower end of the
wage distribution. The rise in lower tail inequality happened in
the 1980s in the United States, but in the 1990s in Germany.
2. Drawing on a variety of data sources, Atkinson (2008) illustrates develop-
ments in earnings inequality in Germany dating back to the 1920s. His ﬁgures
show some increase in overall earnings dispersion over the past two decades.
3. Acemoglu (2002) emphasizes an interesting link between technological
change and institituions. If unions compress wages, then ﬁrms have greater in-
centives to adopt labor-complementary technologies, which will reinforce wage
compression.
4. TheﬁrstoftheseﬁndingshasalsobeendocumentedbyFitzenberger(1999),
using an earlier version of our data for the years 1975–1990. The second ﬁnding is
in line with recent papers by Kohn (2006) and Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2006) who
document a similar increase in inequality in lower-tail inequality in the IABS and
GSOEP, respectively. However, we are not aware of any paper that jointly analyzes
changes in inequality in both the 1980s and 1990s and compares these trends with
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We investigate several explanations for the changes in wage
inequality in Germany. First, we use the kernel reweighting pro-
cedure ﬁrst proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to
analyze whether the changes in inequality are explained by me-
chanical changes in the workforce composition, or whether they
reﬂect changes in skill prices. In line with Lemieux (2006a), we
show that it is important to account for changes in workforce com-
position, in particular at the upper end of the wage distribution.
However, these changes cannot fully account for the divergent
path of upper and lower tail inequality in the 1980s, or for the
divergent path of lower tail inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.
Second, we document a sharp decline in unionization rates in
the late 1990s: The share of workers covered by union agreements
declined from 87.3% in 1995 to 72.8% in 2004. There is little
evidence of a similar decline during the 1980s. Using the same
decomposition method as above, we ﬁnd that between 1995 and
2004, de-unionization can account for 28% of the rise in inequality
at the lower end of the wage distribution, but only 11% at the
upper end.
Third, we document a rise in the wage differential of medium-
skilled workers (i.e., those with an apprenticeship degree) relative
to the low-skilled (i.e., those with no postsecondary education)
starting in the late 1980s, around the same time that lower-tail
inequality started to increase. There is, however, no clear trend
in the wage differential of high-skilled workers (i.e., those with a
college degree) relative to the medium-skilled. We also document
that the decline in the share of the low-skilled started to slow
down in the late 1980s, whereas the share of the high-skilled
increased at a roughly linear rate from 4.7% in 1975 to 14.8%
in 2004. Using a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
production framework based on that of Goldin and Katz (2007b,
2008), we show that ﬂuctuations in relative supply explain the
evolution of the wage differential between the low- and medium-
skilled very well, but do a poor job in predicting the evolution of
the wage differential between the medium- and high-skilled.
Fourth, building on the analysis of Spitz-Oener (2006), we
provide evidence that is consistent with a polarization of work:
during the 1980s and 1990s, occupations with high median wages
in 1980 experienced the highest growth rate, whereas occupations
in the middle of the 1980 wage distribution lost ground relative
to occupations at the bottom. Moreover, occupations at the high
end of the 1980 wage distribution predominantly use nonroutine846 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
analytic and interactive skills, whereas routine task usage is
highest in the upper middle of the wage distribution. This is con-
sistent with Autor, Levy, and Murnane’s (2003) hypothesis that
computer technology decreases the demand for jobs that require
routine manual or clerical skills (and are found in the middle of
the wage distribution) and increases the demand for jobs that
require nonroutine cognitive and interpersonal skills (and are
found at the top of the wage distribution). This paper thus adds
to the growing evidence that technology does not simply increase
the demand for skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, but
instead asymmetrically affects the bottom and the top of the wage
distribution (see, for example, Autor, Katz, and Kearney [2006,
2008] for the United States and Goos and Manning [2007] for the
United Kingdom). This may begin to supply the unifying inter-
national evidence on technological change that so far has been
absent.
Theevidenceprovidedinthispaperisconsistentwiththeidea
that technological change is an important driving force behind the
widening of the wage distribution, particularly at the top. This
conclusion is reinforced by our ﬁnding that for occupations above
the median, employment and wage changes by wage percentile
are positively correlated. In contrast, below-median employment
and wage changes are negatively correlated. The rise in lower-tail
inequality may therefore be better explained by episodic events,
such as supply shocks and changes in labor market institutions.
We argue that these shocks happened a decade later in Germany
than in the United States.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II describes
the data used for the analysis. Section III documents the major
changes in the German wage structure between 1975 and 2004.
We then analyze four possible explanations for the increase in
inequality: changes in the workforce composition (Section IV.A),
a potential decline in unionization (Section IV.B), supply shocks
(Section IV.C), and polarization (Section IV.D). We conclude with
a discussion of our ﬁndings in Section V.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
Our empirical analysis is based on two data sets: the IABS,
a 2% random sample of social security records, and the LIAB, a
linked employer–employee data set. We describe each data set in
turn.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 847
II.A. The IABS: A 2% Random Sample of Social Security
Records, 1975–2004
Our main data set is a 2% sample of administrative social
security records in Germany for the years 1975 to 2004. The data
are representative of all individuals covered by the social security
system,roughly80%oftheGermanworkforce.Itexcludestheself-
employed, civil servants, individuals currently doing their (com-
pulsory) military service, and individuals on so-called “marginal
jobs” (i.e., jobs with at most ﬁfteen hours per week or temporary
jobs that last no longer than six weeks). This data set (or earlier
versions of it) has been used to study wage inequality by, among
others, Steiner and Wagner (1998), Fitzenberger (1999), M¨ oller
(2005), Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006), and Kohn (2006).
The IABS has several advantages over the German Socio-
Economic Panel, the data set most often used to analyze trends
in inequality in Germany (e.g., OECD [1996]; Steiner and Wagner
[1998]; Prasad [2004]). First, the IABS is available from 1975
onward, as opposed to 1984 for the GSOEP. Second, the sample
size is much larger (more than 200,000 observations per year, as
opposed to around 2,000 in the GSOEP). Third, wages are likely to
be measured much more precisely in the IABS than in the GSOEP,
as misreporting by ﬁrms in the IABS is subject to severe penalties.
Fourth, attrition rates in the GSOEP are large enough so that
results may not be representative for the population as a whole
(see, e.g., Spieß and Pannenberg [2003]). In contrast, although
workers can also be followed over time in the IABS, each year the
original sample is supplemented by a random sample of new labor
market entrants. This guarantees that the IABS is representative
of workers who pay social security contributions.
The main disadvantage of the IABS isthat it is right-censored
at the highest level of earnings that are subject to social security
contributions. Overall, each year between 9.4% and 14.2% of the
male wage distribution is censored. Because of censoring, this
paper mostly focuses on the changes in the uncensored part of the
wage distribution, up to the 85th percentile. In the United States,
much of the action in rising wage inequality since the mid-1980s
has been above the 85th percentile (e.g., Piketty and Saez [2003];
Autor, Katz, and Kearney [2008]); consequently, topcoding in our
data may lead us to substantially understate inequality growth.
Another difﬁculty in our data is a structural break in the
wage measure in 1984. From 1984 on, our measure includes848 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
bonus payments as well as other one-time payments (Steiner and
Wagner 1998). We follow Fitzenberger (1999) and correct for the
break (see Appendix I.A for details). Further, our data set does
not contain precise information on the number of hours worked;
we only observe whether a worker is working full- or part-time
(deﬁned as working less than 30 hours per week). We therefore
restrict the wage analysis to full-time workers and use the daily
wage, averaged over the number of days the worker was working
in the year, as our wage measure. Robustness checks against the
GSOEP suggest that this does not affect our results.
From this database, we select all men and women between 21
and60yearsofage.Becausethelevelandstructureofwagesdiffer
substantially between East and West Germany, we concentrate
on West Germany (which we usually refer to simply as Germany).
Although we provide a descriptive overview of the evolution of
inequality for both men and women, our main analysis focuses
on men only. Further details on the sample selection and variable
description can be found in Appendix I.B.
II.B. The LIAB: Linked Employer–Employee Data, 1995–2004
The data set just described provides no information on union
coverage, and thus cannot be used to analyze the impact of de-
unionization on the wage structure. Our analysis here is based on
the LIAB, a linked employer–employee data set provided by the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB). It combines informa-
tion from the IAB Establishment Panel with information on all
workers who were employed in one of these ﬁrms as of the 30th of
June. The information on workers is drawn from the same social
security records as our main data. A detailed description of this
data set can be found in Herrlinger, M¨ uller, and Bellmann (2005).
Although data are available from 1993 to 2004, we use only
waves from 1995 onward, for which information on union recogni-
tion is consistent. In Germany, a ﬁrm recognizes a union either by
joining an employer federation (Arbeitgeberverband), or by engag-
inginbilateralnegotiationswiththeunion.Intheﬁrstcase,union
wages are negotiated at a regional and industry level, typically on
an annual basis. Our union variable distinguishes between ﬁrm-
and industry-level agreements.
The IAB establishment panel oversamples large establish-
ments. To make our results representative of the German econ-
omy as a whole, we weight our results using the cross-sectional
weights provided by the LIAB. In Table B.1 in Online Appendix B,REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 849
we compare median wages as well as interquantile differences for
men in the LIAB and the IABS. The two data sources draw a very
similar picture of the developments in the wage structure over
this period.
III. TRENDS IN WAGE INEQUALITY
Next, we describe the major changes in wage inequality in
Germany from 1975 to 2004 (Section III.A). We then compare
our ﬁndings with those reported in other studies in Section III.B.
Because of wage censoring, we focus on the changes in the uncen-
sored part of the wage distribution and impose no distributional
assumptions on the error term in the wage regression. However,
some of our ﬁndings, such as the evolution of the standard devia-
tion of log wages and log wage residuals, require distributional
assumptions. We assume that the error term is normally dis-
tributed, with a different variance for each education group and
each age group, and impute the censored part of the wage distri-
bution under this assumption. We prefer to work with imputed
wages rather than with censored wages because wage residuals
can be computed in a straightforward manner. A comparison be-
tweenOLSestimatesbasedonimputedwagesandTobitestimates
based on censored wages shows that both the estimates and the
standard errors are almost identical. More details on the impu-
tation method can be found in Appendix I.C. We have conducted
extensive robustness checks regarding alternative distributional
assumptions, including an upper-tail Pareto distribution. Our re-
sults are highly robust to alternative imputation methods. Find-
ings for alternative imputation methods can be found in Section
1 in the Online Appendix.
III.A. Basic Facts
Standard Deviation of Log Wages. Figure I displays the evo-
lution of the standard deviations of log wages and log wage resid-
uals. Panel A refers to men, Panel B to women. The standard
deviation is obtained from standard OLS regressions on imputed
wages, estimated separately for each year. We control for three
education categories, eight age categories, and all possible inter-
actions between these two. For men, the ﬁgure shows a continuous
rise in both overall and residual inequality during the 1980s, with
an acceleration in the 1990s. A simple within–between decom-
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FIGURE I
Evolution of the Standard Deviation of Log Wages and Log Wage Residuals
Source. 2% IABS Sample for full-time workers between 21 and 60 years of age.
The ﬁgures plot the evolution of the standard deviation of log wages and log
wage residuals. Results are based on imputed wages that assume that the error
term in the low-wage regression is normally distributed, with a different variance
for each education and each age group. Regressions control for three education
categories and eight age categories, as well as all possible interactions between
these two variables.
occurred within age and education groups (86% between 1975 and
1989, and 65% between 1990 and 2004).
For women, in contrast, the standard deviation of log wages
and log wage residuals remained roughly constant during the
1980s, and started to increase only in the mid-1990s. A further
difference between men and women is that age and education
explain a smaller portion of the overall variance of log wages
for women. As with men, most (82%) of the increase in overall
inequality between 1990 and 2004 is due to a rise in within-group
inequality.
The Top versus the Bottom. Next, we separately analyze
changes in inequality at the bottom and top of the wage distribu-
tion.FigureIIdisplaysthewagegrowthofthe15th,50th,and85th
percentiles of the wage distribution. We distinguish between the
pre- and postuniﬁcation periods (1975 to 1989 and 1990 to 2004).
For men, the 15th and 50th percentiles evolved similarly between
1975 and 1989, and increased by about 16%. Over the same time
period, the 85th percentile rose by 27.2% (Panel A). The picture
looks very different during the 1990s (Panel C): between 1993 and
2004, the 15th percentile declined by almost 5%, whereas the 50th
and 85th percentiles increased by 4% and 13%, respectively.
The pattern for women is somewhat different: between
1975 and 1989, wage gains were highest for the 15th percentile
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FIGURE II
Indexed Wage Growth of the 15th, 50th, and 85th Percentiles: The Pre- versus
the Postuniﬁcation Period
Source. 2% IABS Sample for full-time workers between 21 and 60 years of age.
The ﬁgures show the indexed (log) real wage growth of the 15th, 50th, and 85th
percentiles of the wage distribution. Panels A and B refer to the pre-uniﬁcation
period between 1975 and 1989, with 1975 as the base year. Panels C and D refer
to the post-uniﬁcation period between 1990 and 2004, with 1990 as the base year.
period, both the 50th and the 85th percentile grew by about 22%,
comparedto16%and27%formen(PanelB).Inthepostuniﬁcation
period, in contrast, wages at the 15th percentile stagnated, while
the 85th percentile experienced the highest wage growth (17%,
Panel D). Unlike the 1980s, in the 1990s wages of women caught
up to those of men throughout the entire wage distribution.
Figure III illustrates the divergent developments of the lower
and upper ends of the wage distribution during the 1980s and
1990s in a different manner. It shows log real wage growth across
the wage distribution, for the period between 1980 and 1990, as
well as between 1990 and 2000. In the 1980s, male wages grew
across the distribution, but substantially more so at the upper
than at the lower tail. Wage growth accelerates beyond the 65th
percentile. In contrast, between 1990 and 2000, wage growth has
been negative below the 18th percentile, with wage losses at the
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Wage Growth by Percentile: The 1980s versus the 1990s
Source. 2% IABS Sample for full-time workers between 21 and 60 years of age.
The ﬁgures plot wage growth by percentile from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990 to
2000. Due to censoring, we plot wage growth for men up to the 85th percentile only.
15th percentile, wage growth increases roughly linearly along the
wage distribution (Panel A).
For women (Panel B), the 1980s are characterized by wage
compression at the lower tail of the wage distribution, whereas
wage growth at the very top (i.e., the 95th percentile) exceeds
that at the median by about 6%.5 In the 1990s, in contrast, wage
growth increases roughly linearly along the wage distribution.
How do these ﬁndings compare with developments in the
United States? Both countries show an increase in inequality at
the top of the wage distribution during the 1980s and 1990s, al-
though in Germany the increase is more pronounced for men than
for women. The two countries differ sharply with respect to the de-
velopments at the bottom of the wage distribution. In the United
States, the 50–10 wage gap rose substantially in the 1980s, but
ceased to increase in the 1990s. In Germany, the pattern is re-
versed. What about the magnitude of the changes? Because our
wage measure is the full-time daily wage, our ﬁndings are proba-
bly most comparable to those based on the March CPS for weekly
full-time earnings. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) report that
between 1975 and 2004, the difference between the 90th and 50th
percentiles of the male earnings distribution increased by about
onelogpointperyear(theirFigureIII).Weﬁndthatoverthesame
time period, the 85–50 wage gap in Germany rose by about 0.6 log
points per year. However, it is important to bear in mind that in
the United States, much of the action in rising wage inequality
5. Becauseforwomenlessthan5%ofwagesarecensored,weplotwagegrowth
up to the 95th percentile.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 853
since the mid-1980s has been above the 85th percentile.6 Hence,
topcoding of our data could lead us to substantially underestimate
the rise in upper-tail inequality during the 1980s and 1990s.
III.B. Comparison with Existing Studies
These results seem to contradict the usual view that wage
inequality in Germany has been largely stable over the past two
decades, and in particular during the 1980s. What explains this
discrepancy? The reason is that the majority of existing studies
on inequality trends in Germany, such as OECD (1996), Steiner
and Wagner (1998), and Prasad (2004), are based on a different
data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel. Studies based on the
IABS are generally consistent with our ﬁndings. In particular,
Fitzenberger (1999) emphasizes that wage inequality rose during
the 1980s, and that the increase was concentrated at the top of
the distribution. His study uses data from 1975 to 1990 only and
was therefore not able to detect the large increase in lower-tail
inequality in the 1990s.7 Existing studies based on the GSOEP
and our study based on the IABS thus seem to draw different
pictures of the trends in inequality in Germany.
We have investigated three possible explanations for the dis-
crepancy between our ﬁndings and those based on the GSOEP.
First, the GSOEP includes civil servants and the self-employed,
but these workers are excluded from the IABS. Second, the wage
measure in the IABS includes bonuses as well as other one-time
annual payments. In contrast, studies based on the GSOEP typi-
cally do not include one-time payments, although they are avail-
able. Third, and most importantly, most studies based on the
GSOEP construct an hourly wage rate, whereas the wage mea-
sure in the IABS is a daily wage.
Here, we provide only a brief overview, focusing on men. A
detailed comparison between the GSOEP and IABS can be found
in Section 3 of the Online Appendix. Our ﬁndings indicate similar
trendsininequalitywhetherornotweincludecivilservantsorthe
self-employed, and whether or not we include bonuses and other
one-time payments in our wage measure. Importantly, inequality
6. See, for example, Piketty and Saez (2003), Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005),
Goldin and Katz (2007a), Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007), and Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008).
7. Other studies using the IABS focus on other aspects of the wage structure.
For instance, Kohn (2006) concentrates on the recent developments in the 1990s
as well as differences between East and West Germany (see also M¨ oller [2005]),
whereas Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006) analyze trends in the returns to education.854 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
trends based on monthly wages are also similar to those based on
hourly wages. Any differences between the GSOEP and IABS are
therefore not adequately explained by differences in the sample
used or by differences in the wage measure.
Our analysis further indicates that inequality rose during
the 1990s in the GSOEP, in particular at the bottom of the wage
distribution, which has also been stressed by Gernandt and
Pfeiffer (2006). Our analysis also highlights that measures of
inequality are very noisily estimated in the GSOEP. The changes
in the 50–15 and 85–50 wage gaps as well as the changes in the
standard deviation of log-wages between two years observed in
the IABS are almost always within the 95% conﬁdence interval of
that observed in the GSOEP. For instance, using the speciﬁcation
that most closely resembles that in the IABS, the 95% conﬁdence
intervals for the changes in the 50–15 and 85–50 wage gaps
between 1993 and 2002 are [0.044,0.154] and [−0.039,0.103], re-
spectively. Over the same period, the 50–15 and 85–50 wage gaps
rose by 0.059 and 0.058 in the IABS. Given the large standard
errors in the GSOEP, it is not surprising that earlier studies, such
as the 1996 OECD Employment Report, concluded that the Ger-
man wage structure was largely stable between the mid-1980s to
mid-1990s.
Next, we explore several explanations for the rising wage in-
equality inGermany. Here, we restrict the analysis tomen, for two
reasons. First, female labor force participation rates rose consid-
erably during the 1980s and 1990s; this is likely to have changed
the selection of women into work, which may have had an inde-
pendent impact on the female wage structure.8 Second, although
the basic patterns in the wage structure (i.e., upper-tail inequal-
ity increased during the 1980s and 1990s, whereas lower-tail in-
equality mostly increased in the 1990s) are similar for men and
women, there are also important differences. For instance, wage
gains are substantially larger for women than for men, especially
in the 1990s. Moreover, the increase in upper-tail inequality is
more pronounced for men than for women, especially in the 1980s.
Explaining these differences between men and women would be
beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) demonstrate that in the United States it is
important to account for the changing selection of women into the workforce when
computing male–female wage differentials.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 855
IV. WHY DID WAGE INEQUALITY INCREASE?
IV.A. The Role of Composition and Prices
Is the increase in inequality described in the previous section
explained by changes in the workforce composition, or do they
reﬂect changes in skill prices? To see why it is important to ac-
countforcompositionalchangesintheworkforce,supposethatthe
variance of log wages is increasing in education and age. If the em-
ploymentshareofeducatedandolderworkersincreasesovertime,
then this will lead to a mechanical rise in inequality, even if skill
prices do not change. Lemieux (2006a) stresses that in the United
States, a large fraction of the rise in residual wage inequality be-
tween 1973 and 2003—and all since 1988—can be attributed to
such changes in the workforce composition. This section employs
the kernel re-weighting approach developed by DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (1996) to recover the counterfactual wage distribu-
tion that we would have observed if the workforce composition
had remained unchanged. Like Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008),
we focus on the divergent path of upper- and lower-tail inequal-
ity in the 1980s and 1990s, rather than the variance of log wage
residuals, as does Lemieux (2006a).
The following expression decomposes the observed density of
log wages w in years t and t  i n t oa“ p r i c e ”g(.) and a “composition”
function h(.) (see also Autor, Katz, and Kearney [2008]):
f(w | t) =

gt(w | x,T = t)ht(x | T = t)dx and
f(w | t ) =

gt (w | x,T = t )ht (x | T = t )dx.
Here, g(w | x,T = t)isthedensityoflogwages inyear t forobserv-
able characteristics x, and h(x | T = t) is the density of character-
istics x in year t. To compute the counterfactual wage distribution
in year t  that would have prevailed if the workforce composition
were the same as in year t, we simply need to reweight the price
function gt (.) in year t  by the ratio ht(.)/ht (.) of the densities of
characteristics x in years t and in year t .9 In our application,
all regressors (i.e., all possible interactions between three educa-
tion and eight age groups) are categorical, and the reweighting
function is therefore straightforward to compute.




Pr(T=t |x) · 1−Pr(T=t)
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This decomposition method applies to calculating counterfac-
tuals for overall inequality. To recover counterfactuals for resid-
ual inequality, we replace the pricing function gt(w | x,T = t)w i t h
the residual pricing function gt(  | x,T = t). The residuals are ob-
tained from OLS regressions on imputed wages that control for
all possible interactions between three education and eight age
groups. We would like to point out that we do not need to im-
pose any distributional assumptions on the error term to obtain
the uncensored part of the counterfactual distribution of over-
all inequality. However, distributional assumptions are required
to compute the counterfacutal distribution of residual inequality.
Ourresultsarerobusttoalternativeimputationmethods(seeSec-
tion 1 of the Online Appendix for details). It is also important to
stress that the decomposition ignores general equilibrium effects,
as it is based on the assumption that changes in quantities do not
affect changes in prices.
Table I provides a ﬁrst overview about how wage dispersion,
measured as the 50–15 and 85–50 wage gaps, and employment
shares vary by age and education groups. We distinguish three
education groups, which we label low, medium, and high. The
low-skilled are workers who enter the labor market without
postsecondary education. The medium-skilled are workers who
completed an apprenticeship or a high school degree (Abitur).
The high-skilled are workers who graduated from a university
or college. Due to severe censoring for the high-skilled, we only
report the 50–15 wage gap for this group. Note that this may
lead us to understate the increase in within-group inequality, as
in the United States much of the growth in inequality is found in
the top half of the high-skilled group.
Results are based on imputed wages, and cells where the
85th or 50th percentile is censored are marked. Similar to the
United States, wage dispersion is increasing in education and—
with the exception of the low-skilled—in age. The share of the
low-skilled decreased by 13 percentage points between 1976 and
1990, but only by 3.6 percentage points between 1990 and 2004.
The share of the high-skilled rose monotonically from 4.7% in
1976 to 14.7% in 2004. The share of workers below the age of 36
rose from 38.9% in 1976 to 41.6% in 1990 and declined to 30.9%
in 2004. Table I also highlights that wage dispersion rose within
education and age groups, suggesting that mechanical changes
in the workforce composition cannot fully account for the rise in
inequality. Between 1976 and 1990, the medium-skilled above theREVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 857
TABLE I
WITHIN-GROUP WAGE DISPERSION BY AGE AND EDUCATION (MEN)
Within-group wage dispersion Worker share
1976 1990 2004 1976 1990 2004
Low
<36, 50–15 0.242 0.286 0.500 0.085 0.046 0.034
85–50 0.215 0.231 0.354
36–45, 50–15 0.226 0.233 0.395 0.088 0.025 0.029
85–50 0.215 0.233 0.275
>45, 50–15 0.227 0.206 0.335 0.083 0.054 0.026
85–50 0.217 0.245 0.257
All, 50–15 0.232 0.248 0.474 0.256 0.125 0.089
85–50 0.217 0.238 0.294
Medium
<36, 50–15 0.239 0.241 0.326 0.285 0.336 0.238
85–50 0.270 0.269 0.327
36–45, 50–15 0.250 0.268 0.307 0.223 0.188 0.280
85–50 0.284 0.346 0.374
>45, 50–15 0.249 0.260 0.314 0.189 0.261 0.247
85–50 0.297∗ 0.361 0.408
All, 50–15 0.252 0.261 0.327 0.697 0.785 0.764
85–50 0.286 0.348 0.379
High
<36, 50–15 0.313 0.283 0.365 0.019 0.034 0.037
36–45, 50–15 0.400∗ 0.344 0.376 0.016 0.029 0.063
>45, 50–15 0.388∗ 0.364∗ 0.414 0.011 0.027 0.046
All, 50–15 0.426∗ 0.343∗ 0.410 0.047 0.090 0.147
Source. 2% IABS Sample for men between 21 and 60 years of age working full-time.
Notes. The ﬁrst three columns of the table report the 50–15 and 85–50 wage gaps for each education/age
cell. Results are based on imputed wages. Due to severe censoring for the high-skilled, we only report the
50–15 wage gap here. Cells where the 85th (or 50th) percentile is censored are marked (*). The second set of
columns show the worker share of each cell. The low-skilled are workers who enter the labor market with no
post-secondary education. The medium-skilled are workers who completed an apprenticeship or have a high
school degree (Abitur). The high-skilled are workers who graduated from university or college.
age of 45 experienced the sharpest rise in inequality, whereas
between 1990 and 2004, the rise in inequality is strongest for the
young low-skilled. For this group, the increase in the 50–15 wage
gap increases by more than 20 log points. Here, it is important
to stress that our data include employees covered by the social
securitysystemonly;iftemporaryandmarginalemploymentwere
included in the data, the increase might be even larger.
Table II reports trends in observed and counterfactual over-
all and residual inequality. We distinguish three interquantile
ranges: 85–15 (Panel A), 85–50 (Panel B), and 50–15 (Panel C).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 859
next rows show the counterfactual change that would have pre-
vailed if the workforce composition were the same as in 1980,
1990, or 2000. The table shows that the overall 85–15 wage gap
increased by about 8.3 log points between 1980 and 1990 and by
10.7 log points between 1990 and 2000. If the labor force composi-
tion had remained the same as in 1980, the 85–15 wage gap would
have risen by 5.5 log points between 1980 and 1990 and by 8.5
log points between 1990 and 2000. The results are similar when
we use the workforce composition in 1990 or 2000 to calculate the
composition-constant increase in overall inequality.
Table II also illustrates that composition effects play a more
important role for the upper tail than for the lower tail of the
wage distribution. During both the 1980s and 1990s, changes in
workforce composition can explain up to 50% of the increase in
upper-tail overall inequality, but at most 15% of the increase
in lower-tail overall inequality. This differs from ﬁndings for
the United States, where the impact of changes in workforce
composition is concentrated at the lower end of the earnings
distribution (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008). Turning to residual
inequality, the qualitative patterns are very similar. However,
composition effects account for a considerably smaller share of
the rise in the residual 85–50 wage gap than in the overall 85–50
wage gap (e.g., 15% versus 37% for 1980 characteristics).
What are the principal factors that explain the role of com-
position in increasing upper-tail inequality, rising education or
population aging? When we account for changes in the education
structure, but not in the age structure, the composition-adjusted
increase in the 85–50 wage gap is similar to the one when we
additionally account for changes in the age structure, during both
the 1980s and 1990s. This suggests that rising education is the
driving factor.
These results demonstrate that it is important to account for
changes in the workforce composition, as emphasized by Lemieux
(2006a). However, mechanical changes in the workforce composi-
tion do not fully explain the increase in upper-tail inequality in
the 1980s, nor do they account for the divergent path of lower-tail
inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.
IV.B. Decline in Unionization
Several papers in the United States argue that part of the
increase in inequality in the 1980s can be linked to a decline
in the minimum wage and unionization (e.g., DiNardo, Fortin,860 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE III
DECLINE IN UNION COVERAGE (MEN)
No agreement (%) Firm-level (%) Industry-level (%)
1995 12.7 10.1 77.2
1996 13.1 10.6 76.3
1997 13.6 11.4 75.0
1998 19.1 7.7 73.2
1999 22.1 8.3 69.6
2000 24.5 7.3 68.2
2001 24.7 8.2 67.1
2002 25.2 7.9 66.9
2003 25.3 8.6 66.1
2004 27.2 7.1 65.7
Source. LIAB (1995–2004) for men between 21 and 60 years of age working full-time.
Notes. The ﬁrst column reports the shares of workers neither covered by ﬁrm-level nor by industry-
level agreements. The second and third columns display the shares of workers covered by ﬁrm-level and
insdutry-level agreements, respectively. Entries are weighted to be representative for workers.
and Lemieux [1996]; Lee [1999]; Card and DiNardo [2002]; Card,
Lemieux, and Riddel [2004]). We now explore this hypothesis for
Germany using the LIAB data.
The German system of collective bargaining differs in sev-
eral aspects from that in the United States. Most importantly, in
Germany the recognition of trade unions for collective bargain-
ing purposes is at the discretion of the employer. Once a ﬁrm has
recognized a union, collective bargaining outcomes apply de facto
to all workers in that ﬁrm, no matter whether they are union
members or not. A ﬁrm recognizes a union either by joining an
employer federation (Arbeitgeberverband), or by engaging in bi-
lateral negotiations with the union. In the ﬁrst case, union wages
are negotiated at a regional and industry level, typically on an an-
nual basis. Another key difference from the United States is that
there is no legal minimum wage in Germany. However, union con-
tractsinGermanyspecifywagelevelsforspeciﬁcgroupsinspeciﬁc
sectors, and can be considered an elaborate system of minimum
wages.
Table III, based on the LIAB data set, shows a remarkable
decline in union coverage during the mid-1990s and early 2000s:
Between 1995 and 2004, the share of workers covered by an
industry-level agreement declined by about 12 percentage points,
and the share of workers covered by a ﬁrm-level agreement de-
creased by 3 percentage points. Unfortunately, comparable data
on union coverage do not exist before 1995. For the 1980s, onlyREVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 861
data on union membership are available. Schnabel and Wagner
(2006) report that throughout the 1980s, about 40% of men
were union members.10 By 2000, however, union membership
had dwindled to about 31%. This suggests that the decline in
unionization in Germany is mostly a phenomenon of the 1990s.
There is strong evidence that unions compress the wage
structure in Germany, and more so at the lower end of the wage
distribution (see, for example, Fitzenberger and Kohn [2005];
Gerlach and Stephan [2005, 2006]; Dustmann and Sch¨ onberg
[forthcoming]). A natural question to ask is whether the de-
unionization in the 1990s contributed to the rise in inequality
over this period, in particular at the lower tail of the wage
distribution? To test this hypothesis, we employ the same de-
composition method as in Section IV.A and include as regressors
all possible interactions between the recognition of an industry-
or ﬁrm-level agreement and the three education and eight age
groups. It is again important to stress that the decomposition
method ignores general equilibrium effects; in our application,
this means that the union–nonunion wage differential is assumed
to be independent of union coverage. Moreover, the decomposition
assumes that unionization is exogenous and not itself determined
by the same factors that raise wage inequality. A further as-
sumption behind the decomposition method is that there are no
spillover effects from the unionized to the nonunionized sector.
Figure IV plots the observed wage changes between 1995 and
2004 as well the counterfactual wage changes that would have
prevailed if unionization rates had remained at their 1995 level
across the wage distribution. The ﬁgure illustrates that work-
ers throughout the wage distribution would have experienced a
higher wage growth if unionization rates had not declined. How-
ever, the impact of de-unionization is substantially stronger at the
lower end of the wage distribution. For instance, wages in 2004
would have been 5.5% higher at the 5th percentile, but only 0.2%
higher at the 85th percentile.
We provide more details in Table IV. The ﬁrst set of columns
refer to overall inequality, whereas the second set of columns re-
fer to residual inequality. The residuals are obtained from OLS
regressions on imputed wages. In each pair of columns, we ﬁrst
10. Because in Germany collectively bargained agreements apply to all work-
ers in a ﬁrm that recognizes the union, union membership is much smaller than
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FIGURE IV
Observed versus Composition-Constant Wage Inequality: The Role of
De-unionization
Source. LIAB (1995–2004) for men between 21 and 60 years of age working
full-time.
The ﬁgure plots actual wage growth by percentile from 1995 to 2004, as well
as the wage growth that would have prevailed if unionization had remained at its
1995 level.
hold only unionization constant. We then additionally keep the
age and education distribution constant. We again distinguish
two interquantile differences: 85–50 and 50–15. We ﬁrst report
the observed change, and then the counterfactual change if the
unionization, age, and education distribution had been the same
as in 1995 or 2004, respectively. Between 1995 and 2004, the over-
all 85–50 wage gap rose by 0.068 log points. If unionization rates
had remained at their 1995 level, the increase in upper-tail in-
equality would have been 0.059 log points—a reduction of 13%.
Unionization plays a more important role at the lower end of the
distribution: de-unionization can account for 28% of the increase
intheoverall50–15wagegap.Theﬁndingsaresimilarforresidual
inequality. In line with the results in Table II, workforce charac-
teristics also play an important role, particularly at the upper end
of the distribution.
These results indicate that the decline in union recognition in
the 1990s had a profound impact on the wage structure, especially
at the lower end of the distribution.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 863
TABLE IV
OBSERVED VERSUS COMPOSITION-CONSTANT OVERALL AND RESIDUAL WAGE
INEQUALITY:T HE ROLE OF DE-UNIONIZATION (MEN, 1995–2004)
Overall inequality Residual inequality
Unionization only All Unionization only All
Panel A:   85/50
Observed 0.068 0.068 0.046 0.046
1995 Xs 0.059 0.026 0.038 0.026
2004 Xs 0.057 0.043 0.035 0.020
Panel B:   50/15
Observed 0.063 0.063 0.043 0.043
1995 Xs 0.045 0.038 0.034 0.032
2004 Xs 0.044 0.036 0.030 0.022
Source. LIAB (1995–2004) for men between 21 and 60 years of age working full-time.
Notes. In each panel, the ﬁrst row reports observed changes in the difference between the 85th and
50th (Panel A) and the 50th and 15th (Panel B) percentiles of the overall and residual wage distribution.
Column “Unionziation only” shows the changes that would have prevailed if the unionization were the same
as in 1995 or 2004, respectively. Column “All” shows the corresponding changes that would have prevailed if
unionization as well as the eduation and age distributions were the same as in 1995 or 2004. The residuals are
obtained from an OLS regression on imputed wages that controls for three unionization groups (industry-level
agreement, ﬁrm-level agreement, no agreement), three education groups, and eight age groups, as well as all
interactions between these variables. The imputation assumes that the error term in the wage regression is
normally distributed with different variances for each education and each age group.
IV.C. The Role of Relative Skill Supplies
An important component of the rise in inequality in the
United States is the remarkable increase in the return to ed-
ucation. We now provide evidence on the recent trends in the
skill premium in Germany and analyze the explanatory power
of demand and supply factors. We focus on the wage differ-
ential between medium-skilled workers (i.e., those who com-
pleted an apprenticeship) and low-skilled workers (i.e., those who
lack postsecondary education). For completeness, we also report
results for the wage differential between high-skilled workers
(i.e., those with a university degree) and the medium-skilled.
However, due to the high incidence of censoring among the high-
skilled, these results have to be viewed with considerable caution.
Panel A of Figure V plots the wage differential between the
low- and medium-skilled (left y-axis) and the medium- and high-
skilled(right y-axis).Ourresultsarebasedonimputedwages,and
our regressions control for all possible interactions between three
education and eight age groups. The medium–low and the high–
medium wage premiums are age-adjusted and are computed as a
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Panel B: Predicted versus observed skill premiums
FIGURE V
Fluctuations in Relative Supply and Skill Premiums (Men)
Source. 2% IABS Sample for men between 21 and 60 years of age working
full-time.
Panel A depicts on the left axis the ﬁxed-weighted wage ratio of the medium-
skilled (apprenticeship degree) and the low-skilled (no postsecondary education)
for a composition-constant set of age groups (eight age categories). On the right
axis, the ﬁgure plots the ﬁxed-weighted wage ratio of the high-skilled (university
degree) and medium-skilled for a composition-constant set of age groups. Panel B
plots the observed wage gap as well as the gap predicted by the two-level CES pro-
duction function with three factors, based on estimates in columns (1) in Table V.
where the weights are the employment-weighted worker share in
each age group, averaged over the entire sample period.
The medium–low wage differential declined slightly between
1975and1989andthenincreasedsharplybyabout0.7percentage
points a year. This timing coincides with the sharp rise in lower-
tail wage inequality. It also coincides with the deceleration in the
decline of the share of the low-skilled during the 1990s: Whereas
during the 1970s and 1980s, the share of low-skilled workers de-
clinedfrom25.6%in1976to12.5%in1990,itdecreasedbyonly3.6
percentage points between 1990 and 2004 (Table I). This suggests
that ﬂuctuations in supply may have played an important role in
the rise of medium–low skill premium. The medium–high wage
differential declined between 1975 and 1980, remained roughly
constant during the 1980s and mid-1990s, and started to increase
in the late 1990s. Contrary to the share of low-skilled workers,
the share of university graduates rose at a roughly linear rate
during the 1980s and 1990s, from 4.7% in 1976 to 14.7% in 2004
(Table I).
To analyze the importance of ﬂuctuations in labor supply
more formally, we adopt a two-level CES production function
framework (Goldin and Katz 2007b, 2008). Suppose that output
Y depends only on quantities S and U of “skilled” and “unskilled”










In this expression, A is total factor productivity and λt rep-
resents a shift in technology. The aggregate elasticity of sub-
stitution between “skilled” and “unskilled” workers is given by
σSU = 1/(1 − ρ). “Unskilled” labor is itself a CES subaggregate










The elasticity of substitution between the medium- and the low-
skilled is given by σML = 1/(1 − η). Under the assumption that
labor is paid its marginal product, the medium-low and skilled-







































Relative wages depend on demand shifters λt and θt, on relative
supplies log(St/Ut)a n dl o g ( Mt/Lt), and on the respective elastic-
ities of substitution σSU and σML. We estimate (2) and (3) in two
steps. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate (3) by OLS, and substitute for
log(θt/[1 − θt]) with a linear time trend. We then use the estimate
for σML to compute the quantity Ut of the unskilled labor supplied
in (1). In the second step, we estimate (2) by OLS, this time sub-
stituting log(λt/[1 − λt]) with a linear time trend. To account for
generated regressor bias in the ﬁrst step, we bootstrap standard
errors in the second step. Although our wage differentials refer to
men only, we include women in our supply measures.12
Results are reported in Table V, columns (1) and (2). For the
medium- versus low-skilled, we obtain an estimate for the elas-
ticity of substitution of about σML = 5 (1/0.206). This estimate
is considerably larger than the estimate of around 1.4 typically
found in the United States, but this is likely because the typical
11. This assumption implies that an increase in skilled labor relative to un-
skilled labor does not affect the wage premium of the medium-skilled relative to
the low-skilled.
12. See Appendix I.A. for a detailed description how the wage premiums and
the relative supply measures are computed.866 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE V
REGRESSION MODELS FOR THE EDUCATION WAGE GAP, 1975–2004 (MEN)
Two-level CES Two-factor CES
Medium versus Skilled versus High/medium
low unskilled versus low
(1) (2) (3)
Relative supply −0.206 0.482 −0.252
(0.018) (0.195) (0.020)
Time 0.012 −0.016 0.016
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
R2 .941 .184 .938
Source. 2% IABS Sample for men between 21 and 60 years of age working full-time.
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) report results based on a two-level CES production function model that
combines the low- and medium-skilled into one CES aggregate. Estimation follows in two steps. We ﬁrst
regress the wage premium of the medium-skilled relative to the low-skilled on a linear time trend and on the
supplied quantities of the medium-skilled relative to those of the low-skilled.We then use these estimates to
compute the quantities supplied by the “unskilled” (i.e., a mixture of the low- and medium-skilled). In the
secondstep,weregressthewagepremiumofthe“skilled”(i.e.,thehigh-skilled)relativetothatoftheunskilled
on a linear time trend and the supplied quantities of the skilled relative to those of the unskilled. Column (3)
reports results based on a CES production function model with two factors (high/medium versus low). Here,
we regress the the wage premium of the high- or medium-skilled relative to that of the low-skilled on a linear
time trend and the respective relative supplied quantitities. See Appendix I.A for a detailed description of
how relative skill premiums and relative supplies are constructed.
U.S. estimate refers to the elasticity of substitution between low-
and high-skilled, which are presumably less perfect substitutes
than the low- and medium-skilled considered here.13 This model
can explain 94% of the time variation in the wage premium of the
medium-skilled relative to the low-skilled. Figure V, Panel B, pro-
videsavisualillustrationoftherelationshipbetweenrelativesup-
plies and relative wages for the low- versus the medium-skilled.
The panel plots the observed relative wage gap as well as the gap
predicted by the two-level CES production function using the es-
timates in Table V, column (1), against time. The ﬁgure conﬁrms
our previous conclusions: the model predicts trends in the wage
differential between the medium- and low-skilled very well.
In contrast, for the “skilled” (i.e., university graduates) versus
the “unskilled” (i.e., a CES aggregate of the low- and medium-
skilled), the model performs poorly: the relative supply coefﬁcient
estimate is positive, and the coefﬁcient on the linear time trend is
negative. The model can explain only 18% of the time variation in
13. A complementary explanation for the higher elasticity of substitution in
Germany is that wages in Germany are less responsive to supply and demand
shocks than wages in the United States, due to higher unionization rates.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 867
the relative wage premium between the high- and the combined
medium- and low-skilled (Table V, column (2)).
This could be a sign that a model that combines the low- and
medium-skilled into one CES aggregate is misspeciﬁed. In the
third column of Table V, we report results based on a two-factor
CES production function that includes the medium- and the high-
skilled in one category and assumes that there is only one skill
premium:high/mediumversuslow.Thismodelappearstoperform
well, and can explain about 94% of the the time variation in the
wage premium of the high-/medium-skilled relative to the low-
skilled.
These results suggest that the deceleration in the decline of
low-skill employment shares in the 1990s had a profound impact
on skill prices, and thus the wage structure—particularly in the
lower tail of the wage distribution.14 What caused this decelera-
tion? Although more research is needed on this issue, the timing
suggests that it is a consequence of the breakdown of the com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe, as well as the reuniﬁcation
of East and West Germany. These events lead to a large inﬂow
of East Germans, Eastern Europeans, and ethnic Germans from
Eastern Europe into the West German labor market. Many of
these immigrants were low-skilled; see Bauer et al. (2005) and
Glitz (2007) for more details.
Next, we provide some evidence of a rising demand for the
high-skilled, relative to the medium- and low-skilled, by comput-
ing between-occupation demand shifts for each education group












Here k indexes skill groups and j indexes occupations, Ej is
total labor input measured in efﬁciency units in occupation j,
and Ejk/Ek is group k’s employment share (in efﬁciency units)
in occupation j in the base year. We prefer this measure of
demand shifts over that implied by the CES production function
framework, because it is not based on relative wage differentials,
14. Existing studies on skill premiums in Germany, such as Abraham and
Houseman (1995) and Acemoglu (2003), focus on the wage differential of college
graduates relative to that of non-college graduates, and use data until the early
or mid-1990s only. This explains why these studies fail to detect the deceleration
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FIGURE VI
Between-Occupation Demand Shifts: Medium/Low versus High/Medium (Men)
Source. 2% IABS Sample for men between 21 and 60 years of age working
full-time.
The ﬁgure plots between-occupation demand shifts for the medium-skilled rel-
ative to the low-skilled, and for the high-skilled relative to the medium-skilled,
with 1975 as the base year. The demand shift of group k relative to base year 1975
is computed as  Dk =

j(Ejk/Ek)( Ej/Ej), where k indexes education, and j in-
dexes occupation, Ej is total labor input measured in efﬁciency units in occupation
j,a n dEjk/Ek is group k’s employment share (in efﬁciency units) in occupation j
in the base year. We distinguish 82 occupations.
which may be seriously compromised due to the high incidence
of wage censoring among the high-skilled, and because it does
not require an estimate for the elasticity of substitution. It is
important to stress, however, that this index does not account
for the impact of price changes on observed employment shifts.
Thus, if positive skill supply shocks cause expansions of high-skill
occupations, this demand index will overstate the “demand”
shock. Conversely, if skill premiums rise due to demand shifts,
occupational shifts will be smaller than the price-constant coun-
terfactual, thus leading the index to understate the “demand”
shift. Figure VI plots the between-occupation demand shifts
of the medium- versus low-skilled, and the high- versus the
medium-skilled. The ﬁgure indicates a considerable demand shift
favoring the high-skilled relative to the medium-skilled during
the 1980s and 1990s. This demand shift was substantially larger
than that favoring the medium-skilled relative to the low-skilled.
To put these numbers into perspective, Katz and Murphy (1992)REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 869
report a between-industry demand shift of college graduates
relative to high school graduates of 0.067 between 1979 and
1987.15 Over the same period, we ﬁnd a between-occupation
demand shift of 0.157 and a between-industry demand shift of
0.084 for the high- relative to the medium-skilled.
IV.D. Polarization
Our ﬁndings highlight the importance of distinguishing be-
tween changes in lower- and upper-tail inequality. Moreover, Fig-
ure VI suggests that demand shifts for the high-skilled relative
to the medium-skilled exceed those for the medium-skilled rel-
ative to the low-skilled. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008)
provide a simple demand-based explanation for this pattern (see
also Autor, Levy, and Murnane [2003]). The idea is that tech-
nological change—in particular, the implementation of computer
technology—differently affects the bottom and top ends of the
skill distribution. Suppose that computerization decreases the de-
mand for jobs that require routine analytical or clerical skills,
and increases the demand for abstract, nonroutine cognitive and
interpersonal skills. Computer technology neither strongly com-
plements nor strongly substitutes for manual skills. If routine
analytical skills are predominantly used in the middle, and man-
ual and interactive skills at the bottom and top of the wage dis-
tribution, then technological change may lead to “polarization”
(Goos and Manning 2007) and thus affect the wage distribution
differently at the bottom and the top. For Germany, Spitz-Oener
(2006)providesevidencethatbetween1979and1999,thedemand
for interactive and nonroutine analytical skills increased, while
the demand for routine-cognitive skills declined. Much of these
changes can be linked to computerization. This section further
investigates this hypothesis for Germany.
We ﬁrst test a key assumption behind this approach: Non-
routine cognitive tasks are predominantly used at the upper ends,
whereas routine and manual tasks are more common at the mid-
dle and lower ends of the wage or skill distribution. To this end, we
rank the 340 occupations in our data according to their median
wages and group them into 100 equal-sized groups. Figure VII,
Panel A, plots the smoothed share of men performing manual, ab-
stract, and routine tasks in each occupation, using the 1991 wave
15. This number is based on the between-industry demand shifts reported in
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Panel A: Task input by occupation skill percentile
FIGURE VII
Change in Occupation’s Employment Shares and Task Usage by Skill Percentile
in 1980 (Men)
Source: German Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey, 1991, full-time men between
21 and 60 years of age.
Panel A depicts the share of workers performing routine, manual, and abstract
tasks by the 1980 Occupational Percentile, using a locally weighted smoothing re-
gression with bandwidth 0.5 and 100 observations. Occupations at the 3-digit level
are ranked according to employment-duration weighted median wages and then
grouped into 100 equal-sized groups, using the IAB data. Routine tasks include
calculating and bookkeeping; correcting texts/data; equipping machines; shipping
and transporting; and ﬁling and archiving. Manual tasks include repairing or
renovating houses/apartments/machines/vehicles; restoration of art/monuments;
serving or accomodating; cleaning; and rubbish removal. Abstract tasks include
research, evaluation, and planning; making plans, constructing, designing, and
sketching; working out rules/prescriptions; using and interpreting rules; lobbying,
coordinating, and organizing; teaching and training; selling, buying, and advertis-
ing; entertaining and presenting; employing and managing personnel.
of the German Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey.16 The share of
workers performing manual tasks declines monotonically with
the occupational wage. Interestingly, abstract tasks are some-
what more common at the lower end of the occupational wage
16. The survey is conducted jointly by the Federal Institute for Vocational
Education and Training (BIBB) and the Institute for Employment (IAB), with
the goal of tracking skill requirements of occupations. See Spitz-Oener (2006)
for a detailed description of the data. Routine tasks include calculating and
bookkeeping; correcting texts/data; equipping machines; shipping and transport-
ing; and ﬁling and archiving. Manual tasks include repairing or renovating
houses/apartments/machines/vehicles; restoring art/monuments; serving or acco-
modating; cleaning; and rubbish removal. Abstract tasks include research, evalua-
tion, and planning; making plans, constructing, designing, and sketching; working
out rules/prescriptions; using and interpreting rules; lobbying, coordinating, and
organizing; teaching and training; selling, buying, and advertising; entertaining
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Panel B: Smoothed changes in employment
FIGURE VII
Change in Occupation’s Employment Shares and Task Usage by Skill Percentile
in 1980 (Men)
Source: 2% IABS Sample for men between 21 and 60 years of age working
full-time.
Panel B depicts log changes in employment shares, where the 3-digit occupa-
tions in our data are ranked according to their mean years of education (employ-
mentdurationweighted)andthengroupedinto100equal-sizedgroups.Weemploy
locally weighted smoothing regressions with 100 observations and bandwidth 0.8.
distribution than in the middle, and (as expected) most common
at the high end. The relationship between routine task usage and
occupational wages is likewise nonmonotone, with the share of
workers performing routine tasks being highest around the 80th
wage percentile.
Following Goos and Manning (2007) and Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008), we next test whether occupations in the middle
of the skill distribution experienced lower growth rates than oc-
cupations at the bottom and top of the skill distribution. We again
rank occupations by their median wages and group them into 100
equal-sized groups. Figure VII, Panel B, plots the smoothed log
changes in the employment shares by occupational skill for two
periods: 1980–1990 (when wage inequality rose mostly at the top)
and 1990–2000 (when wage inequality rose at both the top and
the bottom). Both decades are characterized by polarization in
employment growth: employment shares of occupations at the top
of the wage distribution increased substantially in both periods.
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distribution declined. Occupations at the low end of the wage dis-
tribution have experienced neither strong losses nor strong gains.
In order to more formally analyze the relationship between
changes in occupational employment shares by skill percentile
(measuredasmedianwages)andwagechangesbywagepercentile
in each decade, we estimate OLS regressions of the following form
(see also Autor, Katz, and Kearney [2008]):
 Epτ = ατ + βτ wpτ +  pτ.
In this expression,  Epτ denotes the change in log occupational
employment at skill percentile p and decade τ,a n d wpτ repre-
sents the change in the daily wage at wage percentile p in the
same decade. We estimate β80 = 0.43 (t-value: 1.28) for the 1980s,
and β90 = 0.65 (t-value: 1.56), suggesting that employment and
wage changes are weakly positively correlated. However, in both
the 1980s and the 1990s this masks important differences at the
lower and upper ends of the wage distribution: below the me-
dian, the correlation between employment and wage changes is
negative (we estimate β80,p<50 =− 3.05 (3.09) for the 1980s, and
β90,p<50 =− 0.97 (1.81) for the 1990s); in contrast, above the me-
dian the correlation is positive (we estimate β80,p>50 = 1.77 (2.43)
for the 1980s, and β80,p>50 = 3.25 (2.74) for the 1990s). These ﬁnd-
ings differ somewhat from those for the United States, where
changes in employment and changes in wages are strongly posi-
tively correlated in both decades throughout the entire distribu-
tion (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008).
These results are difﬁcult to reconcile with a simple theory of
skill-biased technological change, according to which technology
symmetrically affects the bottom and the top of the wage distri-
bution. They are consistent with a nuanced view of skill-biased
technological change, according to which technology substitutes
for routine tasks, but complements nonroutine tasks, and thereby
increases the demand for workers located mostly at the top of
the wage distribution. Moreover, the negative correlation between
employment and wage changes below the median speaks against
a demand-based explanation for the rise in lower-tail inequality.
Our previous ﬁndings are consistent with the view that the rise in
lower-tail inequality may be better explained by episodic changes,
most importantly the decline in unionization and the changes in
the skill mix of the workforce in the 1990s.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 873
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper challenges the common view that the rise in
wage inequality is a phenomenon observed only in a handful of
countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada. In particular, we revisit trends in wage inequality in
(West) Germany, a country that so far has been singled out as
having a stable wage distribution. Based on a large administra-
tive data set, we ﬁnd that wage inequality in Germany increased
in the 1980s, but mostly at the top of the distribution. In the
early 1990s, wage inequality started to rise at the bottom of the
distribution as well. This holds for both men and women, although
the rise in upper-tail inequality is somewhat more pronounced
among men. Hence, although the United States and Germany
experienced similar changes at the top of the distribution during
the 1980s and 1990s, the two countries markedly differ with
respect to the lower end of the wage distribution: The rise in
lower tail inequality that happened in the United States in the
1980s came a decade later in Germany.
We explore several explanations for the increase in inequal-
ity. Changes in workforce composition play an important role
in explaining changes in the wage structure. However, they
cannot fully account for the divergent path of upper and lower
tail inequality in the 1980s, or for the divergent path of lower
tail inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, our results are
consistent with a polarization of work: occupations that were
at the top of the 1980 wage distribution experienced the largest
growth rates, whereas occupations in the middle declined relative
to occupations at the bottom. This speaks against a simple
theory of skill-biased technological change, according to which
technology increases the demand for skilled jobs relative to that
of unskilled jobs. It is, however, consistent with a more nuanced
view of technological change, according to which technology asym-
metrically affects the bottom and the top of the wage distribution,
by substituting for routine tasks and complementing nonroutine
tasks (e.g., Autor, Levy, and Murnane [2003]). Because results
consistent with a polarization of labor demand have now been
found in three advanced countries,17 this may begin to provide the
unifying international evidence on technological change that so
17. See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008) for the United States and Goos
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far has been absent—although more research for other advanced
countries is needed to fully assess this hypothesis.
Can the polarization of work alone account for the ﬁnding
that in the 1980s inequality mostly rose at the top, whereas in
the 1990s inequality rose both at the top and at the bottom? One
piece of evidence against this hypothesis is that in Germany, em-
ployment and wage changes are negatively correlated for occupa-
tions below the median. The widening of the wage distribution at
the bottom may therefore be better explained by episodic events,
such as supply shocks and changes in labor market institutions.
The hypothesis we put forward here is that these episodic events
happened in the 1980s in the United States, but in the 1990s in
Germany.
First, the 1980s in the United States are characterized by an
erosion of labor market institutions such as labor unions, as well
as a declining minimum wage. In Germany, this process appears
to have started only in the 1990s. Several papers show that these
changes are important in explaining changes in inequality in the
United States, in particular at the lower end of the wage distribu-
tion (e.g., DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [1996]; Lee [1999]; and
Card and DiNardo [2002]). We ﬁnd that between 1995 and 2004,
de-unionization can explain 28% of the increase in lower-tail in-
equality.
Second, skill upgrading started to slow down in the United
States in the early 1980s. In Germany, there is little evidence for
a slowdown in skill upgrading during the 1980s. In the 1990s,
however, the decline in the share of the low-skilled started to
decelerate, whereas the share of the high-skilled kept increasing
at a similar rate as during the 1980s. Several U.S. studies show
that ﬂuctuations in relative labor supply play an important role
in explaining trends in the skill premium (e.g., Katz and Murphy
[1992]; Card and Lemieux [2001]; Autor, Katz, and Kearney
[2008]). We ﬁnd that ﬂuctuations in relative supply go a long way
in explaining trends in the wage differential between the medium-
and low-skilled, but do not predict trends in the wage differential
between the high- and the combined medium/low-skilled.
Why did the slowdown in skill upgrading happen a decade
earlier in the United States than in Germany? Although more re-
search is needed on this topic, the relative increase in the share
of the low-skilled that started in 1990 in Germany is likely to be a
consequence of the breakdown of the communist regimes in East-
ern Europe and of the reuniﬁcation of East and West Germany.REVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 875
These events led to a large inﬂow of relatively low-skilled East
Germans, Eastern Europeans, and ethnic Germans from Eastern
Europe into the West German labor market; many of these immi-
grants were low-skilled (see Bauer et al. [2005] and Glitz [2007]
for more details).
APPENDIX I: IABS, 1975–2004
A. The Structural Break in 1984
Starting in 1984, one-time payments, such as bonuses, are
includedinourwagemeasure(seeBenderetal.[1996]formorede-
tails); as Steiner and Wagner (1998) point out, ignoring this struc-
tural break results in a spurious increase in inequality. We correct
for this break in a way similar to that of Fitzenberger (1999). The
correction is based on the idea that higher quantiles appear to be
more affected by the structural break than lower quantiles, and
thus have to be corrected upward before 1984. To this end, we
estimate locally weighted regressions of the wage ratio between
1982 and 1983 (i.e., before the break), and between 1983 and
1984 (i.e., after the break) on the wage percentiles in 1983 and
1984, respectively, using a bandwidth of 0.2. We then compute the
correction factor as the difference between the smoothed values
of the wage ratios in 1983 and 1984. In order to account for differ-
ential overall wage growth between the periods from 1982 to 1983
and from 1983 to 1984, we subtract from our correction factor the
smoothed value of the wage ratio in 1983, averaged between the
second and fortieth quantiles. In a ﬁnal step, we correct wages
prior to 1984 by multiplying them by 1 plus the correction factor.
B. Sample Selection and Variable Description
Sample Selection. In addition to the selection criteria de-
scribed in Section II, we drop wage spells of workers in apprentice-
ship training. We further impose the restriction that daily wages
(in 1995 DM) have to be at least 20 DM. For the wage analysis,
we use full-time spells only. Part-time spells are included in our
relative supply measures, though with a lower weight (see below).
Wages. Our wage variable is the average daily wage. If a
worker worked for more than one employer in a year, we compute
a weighted average, where the weights are the shares worked for
each employer. Our results are employment duration-weighted: a
worker who works 365 days a year gets a weight of 365, whereas876 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
a worker who works only 7 days a year gets a weight of 7. Wages
are deﬂated by the Consumer Price Index, with 1995 as the base
year. Asof1999, wages aremeasured ineuros;weuseanexchange
rate of 1 euro = 1.95583 DM to convert euros into Deutschmarks.
Wages are censored at the highest level of earnings that is subject
to social security contributions. More speciﬁcally, an individual
may receive a wage increase from her current ﬁrm in the middle of
the year that puts her wage above the censoring limit. In this case,
thewageweobserveisanemployment-durationweightedaverage
between the precensoring wage and the censoring limit.18 For this
reason, we code wages as censored if they are three Deutschmarks
below the censoring limit. Our results are very similar if we fur-
ther reduce the censoring limit by six Deutschmarks.
Education. Our education variable distinguishes three
groups, which we label low, medium, and high. The low-skilled
are workers who enter the labor market without postsecondary
education. The medium-skilled are workers who completed an ap-
prenticeship or a high school degree (Abitur). The high-skilled are
workers who graduated from a university or college (Universit¨ at
or Fachhochschule). In the raw data, the education variable is
missing for 10.6% of observations. However, because our data are
longitudinal, we can impute a value by looking at past and fu-
ture values of the education variable. The analysis in this paper
is based on the education variable IP1 provided by Fitzenberger,
Osikominu, and V¨ olter (2006). This variable is missing for only
1.3% of observations. We code missings as low-skilled. Our ﬁnd-
ingsaresimilarifindividualswithmissingeducationaredropped.
Relative Supply Measures. Quantities supplied are measured
in efﬁciency units. To compute the efﬁciency units, we calculate
the mean real wage (based on imputed wages) by year, sex, edu-
cation, and age. In each year, we normalize wages with the mean
wage of medium-skilled men between 31 and 35. The efﬁciency
unit for each group is computed as the arithmetic average over all
years. The quantity supplied by each education group in a given
year is the number of days worked in that year, multiplied by the
respective efﬁciency unit, summed up over all workers in the ed-
ucation group. Part-time work is included, but weighted down by
0.67 (“long” part-time) or 0.5 (“short” part-time).
18. If the individual switches ﬁrms and earned a wage below the censoring
limit at her old ﬁrm, but a wage above the censoring limit at her new ﬁrm, we
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Education Wage Differentials. The medium-low and the high-
medium wage differentials are based on imputed wages that as-
sume that the error term is normally distributed with the same
variance for each education and age group. This differs from our
baseline imputation rule, which allows different variances across
education and age groups. We chose this restriction because the
high–medium wage differential is now less sensitive to the cho-
sen censoring limit.19 Our OLS regressions control for three ed-
ucation and eight age groups as well as all possible interactions;
this speciﬁcation therefore allows different wage premiums by
age group. The medium–low and high–medium wage premiums
are computed as a weighted average of the respective premium in
each age group, where the weights are the employment-weighted
worker shares in each age group, averaged over the entire sample
period. To compute the wage differential between “skilled” (i.e.,
workers with a university degree) and “unskilled” workers (i.e., a
mixture of the low- and medium-skilled), we predict age-adjusted
wages for each education group in the same way. The wage of
the “unskilled” is a weighted average of the wage of the low- and
medium-skilled, where the weights are the employment-weighted
worker shares of each education group, averaged over the entire
sample period. The wage of the mixture of the high- and medium-
skilled (Table V, column (3)) is computed in the same way.
C. Imputation of Censored Wages
We impute censored wages in the IABS and LIAB under the
assumption that the error term in the wage regression is normally
distributed, with different variances for each education and each
age group. To this end, we estimate censored regressions (allowing
a different variance for each education and age group) separately
for each year (thereby allowing the variance in each group to
vary across years). Wecontrol for all possible interactions between
three education and eight age groups. For each year, we impute
censored wages as the sum of the predicted wage and a random
component, drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and
a separate variance for each education and age group, obtained
from the standard error of the forecast. A comparison between
OLS estimates based on imputed wages and Tobit estimates based
19. Forinstance,in1975thehigh–lowwagegapis12percentagepointshigher
whenthecensoringlimitisreducedby6Deutschmarksandthevarianceisallowed
to vary by education and age. If the variance is restricted to be the same by
education and age, lowering the censoring limit makes little difference.878 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
oncensoredwagesshowsthatboththeestimatesandthestandard
errors are almost identical.
We have also imputed wages under four additional distribu-
tional assumptions. First, we continue to assume that the error
term is normally distributed, but we restrict the variance to be the
same across all education and age groups, or allow for a different
variance for each education–age cell. Second, we assume that the
upper tail of the unconditional wage distribution follows a Pareto
distribution. Third, similarly to U.S. studies based on the CPS,
we replace censored observations by 1.5 times the censoring limit.
Imputations based on the normal distribution, however, suggest
that this imputation factor is too high, and is in fact closer to
1.2. As a fourth robustness check, we therefore replace censored
wages by 1.2 times the censoring limit. Findings for these alterna-
tive imputation methods can be found in Section 1 in the Online
Appendix.
We use a third data set, the GSES (German Structure of
Earnings Survey), to evaluate which imputation method performs
best at recovering the censored part of the wage distribution. The
GSES is a survey of about 22,000 establishments conducted by the
German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce. A scientiﬁc useﬁle is currently
available for the year 2001. The main advantage of the GSES com-
pared to the IABS is that wages are not censored. We ﬁnd that
the imputation method that assumes that the error term is nor-
mally distributed with a different variance by age and education
works somewhat better than the other imputation methods. This
method was therefore chosen for our baseline results.
APPENDIX II: LIAB, 1995–2004
In addition to the selection criteria described in Section II,
we discard all ﬁrms for which the union variable is missing. The
maximum number of establishments lost due to this restriction
is 72 (around 0.8%) in 2001. We further restrict our sample to
ﬁrms that employ at least one man working full time between the
ages of 21 and 60.
Most of the variables in the LIAB closely correspond to those
in the IABS, but there are a few exceptions. First, the wage vari-
able refers to the ﬁrst of July in the LIAB as opposed to an annu-
alized average, as in the IABS. Second, because the LIAB does not
containcompletebiographiesofworkers,itisimpossibletoimputeREVISITING THE GERMAN WAGE STRUCTURE 879
missing observations in the education variable. We therefore code
missing observations as an additional education category.
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